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Meritocracy Voting: Measuring the Unmeasurable
Peter C. B. Phillips
Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, USA; University of Auckland, Auckland,
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University, Singapore
Learned societies commonly carry out selection processes to add new fellows to an existing
fellowship. Criteria vary across societies but are typically based on subjective judgments
concerning the merit of individuals who are nominated for fellowships. These subjective
assessments may be made by existing fellows as they vote in elections to determine the new
fellows or they may be decided by a selection committee of fellows and ofﬁcers of the society
who determine merit after reviewing nominations and written assessments. Human judgment
inevitably plays a central role in these determinations and, notwithstanding its limitations,
is usually regarded as being a necessary ingredient in making an overall assessment of
qualiﬁcations for fellowship. The present article suggests a mechanism by which these
merit assessments may be complemented with a quantitative rule that incorporates both
subjective and objective elements. The goal of “measuring merit” may be elusive, but
quantitative assessment rules can help to widen the effective electorate (for instance, by
including the decisions of editors, the judgments of independent referees, and received
opinion about research) and mitigate distortions that can arise from cluster effects, invisible
college coalition voting, and inner sanctum bias. The rule considered here is designed
to assist the selection process by explicitly taking into account subjective assessments of
individual candidates for election as well as direct quantitative measures of quality obtained
from bibliometric data. Audit methods are suggested to mitigate possible gaming effects by
electors in the peer review process. The methodology has application to a wide arena of
quality assessment and professional ranking exercises. Some speciﬁc issues of implementation
are discussed in the context of the Econometric Society fellowship elections.
Keywords Auditing peer review; Bibliometric data; Election; Fellowship; Measurement;
Meritocracy; Peer review; Quantiﬁcation; Subjective assessment; Voting.
JEL Classiﬁcation A14; Z13; C18.
“Man must not be afraid of what seems impossible to do. History has shown
that human beings possess a wonderful gift of being able to obey the saying of
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Aristotle: ‘Measure the Unmeasurable.’ ” Ragnar Frisch (Examination report as
a student at the University of Oslo, cited in Andvig and Thonstad, 1998, and
later by Louça, 2007.)1
1. INTRODUCTION
Hierarchical elements and status inequalities are pervasive in modern industrialized
society. Social stratiﬁcations arise from multiple sources such as socio-economic
conditions, occupation or profession, earnings, and education. Afﬁliation with the
military or religious orders affects community status just as industrial power, media
exposure, and political inﬂuence enhance visibility in society. By contrast, anthropologists
argue that some hunter-gathering societies are (or were) relatively free from social
stratiﬁcation. Those societies typically comprised small acephalous (or headless) tribal
foraging groups where tasks were more uniformly distributed across a group and decision
making was largely by consensus and there were fewer societal distinctions (Gowdy,
2006).
When stratiﬁcations do exist in society, distinctions are usually clear enough to
identify groupings of individuals according to certain characteristics such as income
and inﬂuence. Quantitative measurement can be straightforward in some categorizations,
but qualitative assessment is often needed in others. Categorical information helps in
distinguishing groups like Fortune 500 companies and celebrity billionaires, and in
providing classiﬁcations such as senior or middle management in industry; quantitative
data provide ﬁne grain information on a myriad of detail concerning characteristics such
as income, wealth, age, size of family, years of education, and so on.
Learned societies, which are the focus of the present work, also operate stratiﬁed social
structures. These societal structures form a meritocracy in which some members occupy
elevated positions relative to others, at least for a time. Virtually all learned societies
have presidents as leaders, a governing body or council that determines policy, and an
executive committee or ofﬁcer(s) as an administrative arm—all with ﬁxed terms. Many
societies award fellowships—usually for life—to members whose credentials distinguish
1The original source was Frisch’s examination article in public ﬁnance in 1919, a document that has
survived but has never been published. Olav Bjerkholt has provided the following literal translation of the
original:
“Man must not be deterred by the apparently impossible. History has shown that the human
beings have had a wonderful ability for obeying the maxim of Aristotle: ‘Make the unmeasurable
measurable.’ ”
These words appear to be the ﬁrst words written by Frisch to be published. Remarkably for an examination
article they formulate, as Andvig and Thonstad (1998, p. 6) put it, “his own overriding future research policy”
to tackle the apparent impossible. Much of the early empirical econometric work on measuring demand
elasticities (e.g., Schultz, 1924) may well have appeared in the same light at that time.
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them within the society. Some also offer distinguished fellowships which honor lifetime
contributions to a discipline. Such fellowships offer status and lead to a stratiﬁed
structure of membership within a society that becomes a distinguishing characteristic of
its meritocracy. Fellowship in a leading international society is generally considered to be
a singular honor. As a public endorsement of merit and accomplishment, it can have a
lasting effect on a career and remuneration. Accordingly, it is highly prized.
The subject of the present article is the selection process by which such fellowships
are determined. Assessment of merit necessarily involves human judgment about the
contributions of individual candidates. But information about and opinions of those
contributions may differ considerably in a voting population. Part of our goal is to
confront the analytic challenge of combining relevant information and opinions in a way
that assists the overall assessment of candidates in a meritocracy vote. Our approach is
to construct a methodology for combining “objective” and “subjective” information for
use in such voting and to broaden the availability of that information during the voting
process. Modern webserver facilities afford community access to massive datasets that can
be tailored to deliver speciﬁc information requirements to assist voters in decision making.
We outline a methodological framework to fortify peer review with such information.
While some examples are given, this is not an article on speciﬁc bibliometric or citation
measures. There is now a vast and growing literature, with many experts, on that subject.
This literature is important to the mechanics of quality measurement and to alert us of
the strengths and limitations of the multitudinous measures that are now available. The
present work has a different orientation. Its focus is directed toward honor society voting
and the analytic mechanisms for building more information into that process rather than
speciﬁc details of the information to be deployed and how that might evolve as more data
become available.
A secondary goal of the article is to open up public discussion amongst economists
and econometricians of the issues involved and how these may affect our academic
societies amidst an explosion of ranking data on individuals and institutions. A consensus
in such discussion may seem out of reach. But the econometrics profession is well
positioned to promote the advancement of evidence-enhanced voting procedures and
suggest mechanisms for incorporating such evidence. The ensuing discussion of this article
and later research by other econometricians may usefully widen the focus to suggest
details of the measurement mechanics, including the bibliometric and citation data that
may be mobilized, with attendant caveats, in the voting process.
Debate on the qualiﬁcations for fellowship is as ancient as learned societies
themselves—witness the famous Hobbes–Wallis controversy involving the Royal Society
in the 17th century. In an archival study on the foundation of the Econometric Society,
Bjerkholt (1998) recently provided extensive evidence of diverging views among the
founders of that Society in the early 1930s about electoral procedures and about
individual candidates for fellows. In a further study, Louça and Terlica (2011) report
continuing divisive debates among the broader fellowship in the 1950s about selection
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criteria for fellowship.2 The issues that manifested in these Econometric Society (ES)
debates relate largely to ﬁeld qualiﬁcations. Concerns over ﬁeld remain unresolved in
the 21st century. They have focused on growing ﬁeld disparities in Econometric Society
fellowship elections and societal appointments as well as the role within the ES of
econometrics itself.3
Distortions in voting may arise for many reasons. For instance, intellectual founders
and leaders may veto certain candidates4; and coalitions of voters can form among visible
(i.e., physically extant) and invisible (e.g., by subﬁeld or intellectual descent) colleges
of electors to secure election for preferred candidates. How, in such a system, can the
merit that underlies a meritocracy be fairly determined, or even deﬁned? What elements—
quantitative and qualitative—might enter into the selection process to substantiate
2The 1950s debate was prompted by correspondence of Oscar Morgenstern circulated in 1953 to all fellows
of the Econometric Society stating that
in my view the Fellows ought to be persons who have done some econometric work in the strictest
sense. That is to say, they must have been in one way or another in actual contact with data they
have explored and exploited, for which purpose they may have even developed new methods.
This viewpoint was strongly supported by some fellows (among them Robert Geary, Charles Roos, and P. C.
Mahalanobis) and opposed by others (including Tjalling Koopmans and Jacob Marschak). In the end, no
changes to criteria or procedures for fellowships were made.
3In a letter to the President of the Econometric Society on June 26, 2010, the author and David Hendry
raised concerns about the role of econometrics within the ES, pointing to
a mounting concern that the Econometric Society has become progressively less representative
of econometricians within the society with consequential impacts, particularly on the careers of
younger econometricians. To many there is an emergent crisis in econometrics because of the
lack of acknowledgement and representation and the growing difﬁculties econometricians have
in publishing in Econometrica and other general interest journals in economics. The movement
away from econometrics is manifested each year in the election of ofﬁcers, council and fellows,
the appointment of Editors of Econometrica, and recently by the formation and nature of the
new journals. While the concern over under-representation has occasionally been raised in Fellows
Meetings at various Econometric Society conferences since the 1980s, the situation seems to many
to have grown considerably worse over the past decade. Many people are now puzzled about the
role of the Econometric Society in terms of what it does for econometrics and the increasing lack
of congruence between its name and its focus. By contrast and in response to the direct needs of
the econometrics community, a large number of highly successful regional and thematic meetings
have been organized that are outside the aegis of the Econometric Society and continue to grow
and prosper without any connection to or support from the Econometric Society.
4From archival research on correspondence among the Council of the Econometric Society in the early
1930s, Louça (2007) reports that one candidate for a fellowship was opposed on the grounds that “he would
not know a partial derivative” (p. 31), an injustice as it turned out. Bjerkholt (1998, p. 53 and footnote
32) provides original source material and further details on this particular incident. Another candidate was
repeatedly opposed as President of the Society as “not recommendable” on the grounds that he “uses many
words to express his meanings” (Louça, 2007, p. 35).
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election? If democratic voting is involved in the selection, how might the human electorate
(of voters) and individual motives be complemented with a material electorate (of data)
so as to promote informed and fair election that mitigates potential distortions? How, in
short, may weaknesses in the democratic voting system be attenuated in societal decisions
on merit?
In empirical research, Hamermesh and Schmidt (2003) analyzed data from fellowship
elections in the Econometric Society over the period 1990–2000 to assess whether
these elections were “fair” in the sense that the votes cast accorded with candidate
qualiﬁcations. Objective measures of quality were based on (i) the average number of
citations to the candidate’s work over the two preceding years, (ii) a count of the
candidate’s publications in Econometrica (the Econometric Society’s journal), and (iii)
an indicator of whether the candidate had ever been an Associate Editor or Coeditor of
Econometrica. Controlling for this measure of quality, logit and probit regressions were
used to assess the empirical signiﬁcance of various other determinants of the election
outcomes. The results revealed that successful election depended on many characteristics
other than quality, including current afﬁliation, ﬁeld, and geographical location.
All voting systems are subject to potential gaming decisions by electors. For instance,
in meritocracy voting where there are thresholds and quotas for election, individual
elector decisions to support, abstain, or rank candidates can end up having a major
impact on outcomes. Coalitions among electors can accentuate this impact, as intimated
above. They can arise by explicit or implicit agreement, possibly from a dimension
of commonality such as institutional or ﬁeld afﬁliation. Top tier institution bias is an
example. Leading institutions often have a large concentration of electors because of the
number of fellows already working in the institution. New candidates for election from
within the institution then have an advantage over other candidates due to (i) extended
common knowledge within the institution of the candidate amongst existing fellows,
which leads to enhanced cross ﬁeld voting in support of such candidates, and (ii) pressure
to sustain or raise perceived institutional status by electing new fellows from within the
institution. The latter pressure sometimes takes the form of explicit exhortations by senior
management, deans, and department chairs to elect new fellows from the professoriate in
order to help raise the institution’s proﬁle. Similar pressures can operate within countries,
regions, subﬁelds, or invisible colleges of electors with common academic pedigrees.
Societies where fellowship decisions are made in committee (such as the Institute of
Mathematical Statistics and the American Statistical Association) rely on peer evaluation
within these committees in reviewing candidate nomination materials, letters of reference,
publication records, research papers, and other evidence such as citation data and
records of mentorship. Subjective assessments of candidates may then be presented
with this supporting evidence, and individual cases can be discussed and decided in a
process that mirrors committee-based promotion decisions and appointment processes in
universities. At a narrower level, this process is analogous to professional journal review
where referee evaluations are solicited in conjunction with associate editor or co-editor
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recommendations. Even when such committees conduct formal votes on candidates, there
is less opportunity to game the ﬁnal decision in this system because of transparency within
small committees. On the other hand, committee decision making is highly subjective,
and the information set that affects decisions is limited to the material presented and by
the knowledge base of the committee members and any research that they may do on
candidates.
In both systems, greater use of quantitative data can enhance informed decision
making. There is also considerable scope for using crowd wisdom within the profession
to raise awareness of the strengths of less well-known candidates, those working outside
the major centres of learning, and those working in less populated or emerging subﬁelds.
Finding a mechanism for promoting fairness across ﬁelds, institutions, and regions,
collecting and distributing the relevant information that can assist in this process, and
respecting subjective assessments of credentials across a population of electors are serious
challenges for any society. Societies in quantitative disciplines like economics may well
be expected to rise to this challenge, as Frisch enjoined in the header to this article, and
show leadership in creating and testing such selection mechanisms.5
This article seeks to offer some material assistance toward that goal and to open the
issues up for professional discussion so that the best ideas may be taken forward. Our
work here provides a quantitative rule that combines human judgment and quantitative
data on credentials in a mechanism that brings this disparate information into the election
or selection process without removing the effect of individual votes on the outcome of
a candidate’s election. The goal, in short, is to assist the process of voting on merit by
measuring merit — measuring the unmeasurable—by widening the effective electorate
that enters the decision process with a broad additional class of objective and subjective
elements. These elements involve a comprehensive (i.e., electorate wide) peer evaluation
component that is combined with bibliometric measures to determine an explicit merit
threshold (a vote percentage) that is needed for election. Peer review and individual
votes continue to play a key role, but they are complemented with material evidence on
accomplishment.
The statistical use of bibliometric data in combination with comprehensive peer
assessment has many potential applications that extend beyond the immediate arena
of fellowship elections. Research assessment exercises that are now undertaken in some
countries (such as the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand) are one example where such
5Some journals in economics already use automated measures in determining fellowships (Journal of
Econometrics), distinguished authorships (Journal of Applied Econometrics), and annual prizes (Econometric
Theory). The measures employed in these awards rely on bibliometric counts and are not complemented with
peer review data.
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data may be used.6 Journal rankings and impact factors of research are another.7 Senior
management teams of universities and journal publishers now make substantial use of
such credentials in promoting their institutions and publications. Researchers who are
accustomed to peer review processes in journal and promotion decisions often ﬁnd
themselves uncomfortable with the mechanical approaches that are typically adopted in
producing these rankings, especially when they are obtained by automated harvesting
of bibliometric or citation data and search engine methods that are themselves subject
to measurement error and outlier effects. The challenge we face in such assessment
exercises is to utilize the vast and growing quantity of such data in a manner that
complements established peer evaluation processes which most professionals view as a
necessary component in quality assessment. The methodology explored in the present
article provides a mechanism to address that challenge and strengthen the data-based
foundation of the quality assessment process.
2. MERIT THRESHOLD AND CREDENTIALS
In societies where fellowship elections are held, candidates need to achieve a certain
threshold percentage () of positive votes from the electorate of voters to be
successful. This voting electorate might be the collection of all existing fellows in
the society, a fellowship selection committee, the governing body or council, or even
the entire society membership. Examples from leading learned societies in economics,
statistics, and national academies are collected and discussed in the Appendix. In
what follows we will concentrate on developing a mechanism that is suited to a
wide-body voting electorate such as all existing fellows, as in the present system
of the Econometric Society, or full society membership voting. Some fairly obvious
modiﬁcations to suit other voting electorates can be made in the system that is described
below.
The threshold percentage  may be arbitrary, such as some number in a certain interval
like  ∈ (025, 075), and it might be set by the governing body of the society or the
selection committee for voting decisions in a committtee on new fellows. Underlying —
either explicit or implicit—is a social welfare function view concerning the size of the
fellowship as a proportion of societal membership. That view may be determined in the
articles of association or the constitution of the society or it may be a matter on which
the council or membership votes from time to time, taking into account issues such as
6Even when bibliometric data are not explicitly used in the preparation of research assessment exercises
or other ofﬁcial rankings, that data may already appear indirectly through individual use in providing “peer
esteem” evaluations that many ranking reports request. The use of automated software that universities now
provide for harvesting publication information also implies that bibliometric data are being routinely utilized
in report preparation.
7See Chang et al. (2012) for a recent overview of various bibliometric research assessment measures and
an empirical application of the methodology to journals in econometrics and statistics using journal citation
reports and the Thomson Reuters ISI Web of Science database.
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generational balance and the future composition and size of the society and its fellowship.
In such cases, it is known that voting over size gives rise over time to decisions that are
time inconsistent (Roberts, 1999). In the Econometric Society, the voting electorate is the
body of existing fellows and the threshold is set to a common value with  = 030 In a
society with over 450 active fellows, to be successful in an election where all fellows vote
a candidate must secure votes from at least 135 fellows. Thresholds may be accompanied
or replaced by a quota system for new fellows, as in the case of the Royal Society where
the quota is currently 44 new fellows each year, or the National Academy of Sciences
where the quota is 84 new members annually.
Thresholds are often decisive in elections. If many strong candidates fall short of
attaining the required percentage of favorable votes, a societal governing body may adjust
the threshold downwards to increase the number of successful candidates in subsequent
elections—possibly to improve perceived social welfare or generational balance. If the
threshold is considered too lenient, then it may correspondingly be increased. In this
sense, the threshold is endogenous. Its value may be reactive both to past election results
and to governing body opinion regarding exclusivity. In effect, the number  is a voting
merit threshold for fellowship which relies directly on inner sanctum views of exclusivity
and indirectly on views of past election results. Typically,  is a common value that applies
across all candidates.
The mechanism suggested in the present article seeks to bring further information to
bear on this critical merit threshold, to provide a ﬂexible data-based method for the
determination of , and to make  individual speciﬁc. The mechanism can be used to
complement existing systems of election by simply importing information into , thereby
making the endogeneity of  explicit and speciﬁc to an individual candidate, without
removing the power of the human electorate of voters to elect.
The credentials that deﬁne merit are subjective and inevitably rely on personal
judgment. But they also rely on knowledge (if only by hearsay or on information
transmitted in nominating statements and referee reports on candidates) of material
accomplishments and personal assessments of the importance and relevance of those
contributions. We therefore propose that the merit threshold be determined to explicitly
incorporate such information—both objective and judgmental—and to do so in a way
that reﬂects a wide body of base knowledge in the profession arising from published
research and its adjudged merit. Importing quantitative and qualitative information
in this way widens the effective electorate beyond the immediate voters: for example,
published research reﬂects decisions taken by editors and the judgments of independent
referees on the worth of a candidate’s research; and citations or online downloads reﬂect
received interest about the research amongst a broad readership of fellow researchers. The
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goal, in effect, is a mechanism that assists in measuring the “unmeasurable” element of
merit in a meritocracy.8
3. A FELLOWSHIP ELECTION FORMULA
In what follows, we lay out an evidence and peer review based approach to determine
. As indicated, we seek to make  individual speciﬁc so that its value may reﬂect the
merits of an individual candidate as measured by the information set that is used in its
determination. The distribution of  across the candidates depends on the distribution
of the inputs of objective and subjective information about those candidates for election.
The resulting distribution differentiates candidates according to their revealed merit, but
it leaves to voters the ultimate task of determining election.
The speciﬁc formula given below is parameterized, and the particular choice of
parameters will inﬂuence outcomes. The formula may be trialed on past election data
to ﬁnd parametric values that correspond closely to actual election outcomes and
those that produce alternative results with greater or lesser numbers of successful
candidates. In the absence of available empirical data,9 we will instead report some exact
distributional results that show the response distribution of  to its inputs for certain
explicit distributions of objective and subjective evidence These distributions reveal the
ﬂexibility of the approach and the way different types and levels of credential information
contribute to outcomes.
Quantifying Individual Merit Thresholds
The starting point is to make the merit threshold  individual speciﬁc. In particular,
for each nominee a personal threshold of voting support—the merit threshold for that
individual—is determined for this person’s election. The merit threshold depends on
accomplishment and is measured by an accomplishment factor X ∈ [0, 1]. The factor
X is the sum of two components X = Xa + Xb, where Xa reﬂects objective information
and Xb embodies judgmental views of the accomplishment. What follows is one possible
8To be measured a quantity must ﬁrst be deﬁned, a task of longstanding relevance in economics whether
the quantity in question is the price level, utility, happiness, or merit. In all such cases the inherent
multidimensional nature of the quantity (and in the present case the subjective elements involved in deﬁning
merit) must be addressed even when a single index proxy variable is used in the accounting process. More
subtle is the fact that, however difﬁcult the accounting deﬁnition may be, it is still far easier than deﬁning
an appropriate probability space for “measuring” the said quantity and using it in statistical work. Almost
always in economics and other social sciences, the probability space is too limited for there to exist any
“true” representation of the measure (or true data generating process (dgp)), a problem that is still largely
untouched in econometrics (see Phillips, 2005, for further discussion).
9A request for data on the annual Econometric Society fellowship election outcomes over 1990–2011,
including the votes received by each of the nominated candidates, was denied. These data would enable
empirical research on ES data of voting formulae such as those considered in this article, the effects of
various parameterizations, and some counterfactual analysis.
MERITOCRACY VOTING: MEASURING THE UNMEASURABLE 11
formula for the determination of X and the manner in which X determines . The
resulting mechanism inevitably involves some arbitrary elements of construction and
speciﬁc parameter settings need to be employed to make the formula operational. Later in
the article we provide some computations to illustrate the use of this formula and detail
its possible implementation. In practice, parameter settings which govern the formula can
be set by a society’s governing body and modiﬁed as may be needed to take account of
the evolution of a discipline over time and the views of the society regarding qualiﬁcations
for fellowship election. The system below is designed in a way that facilitates automated
online implementation.
Objective information: determining Xa
The component Xa depends on quantitative information about research accomplishment
and material contribution to the discipline. We provide here only a skeleton of ideas
to illustrate how Xa might be constructed. One example that we use below is that the
governing body may designate certain core journals from which publication data is
collected. These might comprise major general interest journals and leading ﬁeld journals.
Sole authored and co-authored publications might be distinguished and weighted in a
ratio such as  : 1 for some relativity parameter  In this case, we may deﬁne Y = n1 +
n2 as the core journal publication component where n1 is the number of sole authored
publications and n2 the number of co-authored publications. In the illustration that
follows, we set  = 2 for simplicity, and extensions to the general case are straightforward.
Publication numbers beyond some limit (M) may be ignored in order to delimit quantity
effects. Then, deﬁning N = min(Y ,M), the “objective” data component Xa may be
constructed as Xa = 12 × NM ∈
[
0, 12
]
. In a similar manner, Xa can be modiﬁed to take into
account citations and other data-based measures of research performance and impact.
Since such extensions are fairly obvious and may be individually weighted as components
of Xa, they will not be explored here. The idea is clear enough, even though the details
of determining which indices to use and how they might be constructed will inevitably be
more complex given the vast literature that now exists on the subject of citation indices
and rankings.
Importantly, we conﬁne the support of the objective component Xa to a ﬁxed
subinterval Ua of [0, 1], leaving a residual subset for subjective assessment. With the
speciﬁc rule Xa = 12 × NM , the support Ua =
[
0, 12
]
and Xa carries an implicit weight of 12
in the overall measure X. This weighting system can be altered to reﬂect a societal view
concerning the importance of quantitative information relative to subjective assessment,
as discussed further below.
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Peer evaluation: determining Xb
The component Xb measures the electorate’s collective peer evaluation of a candidate’s
qualiﬁcations for election. There are various ways in which Xb may be determined. We
start with the following basic approach, which presumes honesty in peer evaluations with
no gaming of the system by electors. The basic system is then expanded to control for
gaming effects.
Each member (j) of the voting electorate reports an honest subjective assessment factor
fj ∈ [0, 1] of the candidate (with higher values of f denoting higher subjective assessment
on the [0, 1] scale). To simplify notation at this point, we will use an index (i) for the
candidate. The assessments are averaged to produce a subjective accomplishment factor
f = 1#(Sall)
∑
j∈Sall fj where Sall is the set of all voters (e.g., existing fellows) in the electorate.
Precise rules may be given for determining fj in the case of abstentions, no returns, or
invalid returns. For example, if j ∈ [0, 1] is the subjective assessment of the candidate by
elector j, we may determine fj as follows:
fj = j × 1 j returns a subjective assessment factor j ∈ (0, 1)
+  × 1 j abstains, does not vote, or returns a j ∈ (0, 1) , (1)
where
 = valid = 1# (Svalid)
∑
k∈Svalid
k,
and Svalid is the set of electors who returned a valid assessment factor  ∈ (0, 1). According
to this rule, abstentions, nonvoters and extreme assessments j ∈ (0, 1) are eliminated
and replaced by the average peer assessment () over all those electors returning a
valid assessment. An alternative rule which assigns greater weight to the electors who
nominated the candidate for election would determine  as
 = nom = 1# (Snom)
∑
k∈Snom
k, (2)
where Snom is the set of electors who nominated the candidate and returned a valid
assessment factor  ∈ (0, 1) for this candidate.
In both these rules, extreme 0, 1 assessments are taken to be invalid. This device is
merely suggestive at this point, and a more realistic version for implementation is given
below. The idea is to force electors to think more carefully about fractional assessments
to mitigate the effects of extreme positions. Just as the upper limit M controls tail event
effects in Xa by truncation (winsorizing the data), extreme subjective assessments may be
controlled in Xb by adjusting the support of . The extended system given below shows
how subjective extremes may be controlled by the threat of auditing the peer review.
MERITOCRACY VOTING: MEASURING THE UNMEASURABLE 13
Differential information about candidates is an inevitable factor inﬂuencing peer
assessment and votes. Field differentials may be so great that electors have difﬁculty
appreciating or even reading the work of candidates outside their own ﬁelds. In such
cases, honest electors may not be comfortable returning a personal peer review of the
candidate, but may be ready to delegate their assessment to others, such as (i) the
nominating group, (ii) the fellows selection committee (if one exists), or (iii) other better
informed fellows. Assignation to these alternatives may be arranged by an elector being
offered distinct discrete choices that signal these reassigned assessments, which might be
triggered online automatically by the elector choosing certain discrete integers such as (i)
j = 2, (ii) j = 3, and (iii) j = 1 or 0, as in rule (1).
Discrete choices for reassigning assessments might be accompanied by more explicit
self-selection by electors about their own expertise in a ﬁeld. For instance, electors might
be asked to rank themselves into three general categories as (i) expert (R1), (ii) informed
but not expert (R2), or (iii) an outsider (R3) to the research ﬁeld of each candidate. These
expertise self-selection outcomes, denoted Rjia, a = 1, 2, 3 for candidate i by elector j,
might then be used to weight electors subjective assessments according to some agreed
system (e.g., wia = 1, 12 , 14 for expert, informed, and outsider, respectively). This process
relies on elector honesty in their personal assessments, but it provides a mechanism for
addressing differential information on qualiﬁcations and expertise. In doing so, it can
mitigate cluster voting effects that arise in visible colleges where a group of colleagues
vote en masse in support of a candidate colleague irrespective of their personal expertise
in the candidate’s ﬁeld.
Since this system involves honesty in elector responses, it opens up new opportunities
to game the system. We address this problem by monitoring elector responses and by
introducing the prospect of auditing.
Measures to Mitigate Gaming of the System
Distortions arise in any electoral system from voters seeking to achieve certain ends like
the promotion of individual ﬁelds, institutions, or invisible colleges. The system of peer
evaluation leading to an assessment score like Xb offers a new way of gaming the system.
For instance, a voter who wanted to promote a particular ﬁeld (A, say) could return
a distended positive evaluation, such as  = 099999, for candidates in ﬁeld A, and a
distended low evaluation  = 000001 for candidates outside of A, thereby exacerbating
ﬁeld divisions and avoiding exclusion as an extreme assessment in 0, 1. Similar gaming
techniques might be applied to evaluating candidates on criteria other than ﬁeld.
There are various ways to mitigate such distortions. All of these require some
monitoring of elector returns. The idea we suggest here relies on auditing (or at least the
threat of auditing). It relates to the editorial process by which articles are peer reviewed
for publication. The common system of editorial review involves independent referee
evaluations which are subsequently assessed by an associate editor or co-editor prior to a
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ﬁnal editorial decision. Think of the electors as the referees and the monitors as the senior
editorial team of a journal. Peer evaluation for fellowship election can be managed along
these lines in the following steps.
(i) A monitoring committee (MC) is appointed with a small group of members
representating the main subﬁelds of the discipline. Appointment to the MC may be
made by the president on the advice of the society council or executive committee.
A new MC is appointed annually for each fellowship election, helping to avoid
problems of persistent orientation in decision making. An overview committee
comprising the president, vice president, and past president could also selectively
audit the MC recommendations, resolving potential “quis custodiet ipsos custodes”
problems.
(ii) In the ballot, each elector j is requested to return an honest self-selection rating
(Rjia in the notation above) with regard to each candidate i for whom they return a
quantitative peer evaluation. For example, elector j might return ji = 095 and Rji1,
indicating the elector is a self-regarded expert in the ﬁeld of candidate i and gives
a peer evaluation score of 95% to this candidate. The MC evaluates the responses
(or a selection of responses) and if the self-ranking Rji1 for high expertise regarding
candidate i’s research withstands scrutiny (e.g., candidate i has published in the same
ﬁeld as the elector and has an accompanying statement of some authority on the
candidate’s contribution—see (iii) below), then the peer evaluation fji = wi1 × ji =
wi1 × 095 = 095 stands (subject to a further possible extreme evaluation trigger
check—see (iii) below). If the MC disagrees with the self-ranking, then the peer
evaluation is re-weighted as fji = wib × ji < 095 with a new weight wib that is agreed
by the MC. If no agreement in the MC is reached on the new weighting value, then
i is simply replaced by i,nom = 1#(Si,nom)
∑
k∈Si,nom ik or i,valid = 1#(Si,valid)
∑
k∈Si,valid ik,
as per the earlier discussion. (Here Si,nom and Si,valid are the sets of electors who
nominated candidate i and who validly—i.e., passed the MC audit—voted for
candidate i.) The MC audit may be viewed in the same light as secondary examining
and external examining procedures, such as those in the U.K.
(iii) Extreme peer evaluations for  ∈ (L,U) are audited by the MC. But the audit
trigger parameters
(
0 < L < U < 1
)
are not announced in the election, so that
electors cannot deliberately avoid an audit simply by setting  = L +  for a
candidate they oppose or  = U −  for a candidate they want elected, with some
small  > 0 intentionally selected to avoid the audit. As with accounting audits, the
parameters
(
L,U
)
may be individual elector speciﬁc and they might be determined
by an automated rule that operates outside these parametric settings. For instance,
an audit might be triggered if an elector returns a common evaluation of 090 for
all candidates even though 090 ∈ (L,U). In the audit itself, the MC will look at
the self ranking and supporting statements in the voter’s electronic return. If the
supporting statements on the strength or weakness of the candidates hold up to
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examination, then the peer evaluation ji stands. If not, then the MC will reweight
the assessment or simply replace ji by i,nom or i,valid as in (ii). With this system, if
an elector is strongly in favor of a candidate and has convincing supporting evidence,
then returns of  = 1 may well be validated by the MC.
To operate this system, electronic returns require electors to do the following: (a)
return a vote in favor of each candidate whom they support (simple approval voting);
(b) provide a self selection ranking Rji that reports their level of expertise for each
candidate for whom they vote; and (c), if they choose to do so, write a supporting
paragraph (less than 200 words, say) justifying their support for the candidate and their
subjective assessment of the candidate. Electors are advised that extreme peer evaluations
are audited and are therefore encouraged to submit a supporting statement for all
candidates for whom they vote and particularly those for whom they record an extreme
peer evaluation. Lazy or uninformed electors can simply return their vote and provide
no further information, in which case the peer evaluation will be deemed absent (invalid)
and automatically set to ji = i,nom or i,valid. Thus, demands on electors in this system
are only greater than simple approval voting when electors individually choose to add
further information. The incentive to do so comes from the aspiration that, in addition to
their vote, their other input will be taken into account in the election and may contribute
materially to the outcome.
With monitoring and auditing in effect the revised version of (1) has the following
form. As above, let ji be the reported subjective assessment of candidate i by elector j
and Rjia be elector j’s personal ranking of his expertise with regard to candidate i. Let
the MC and audit results be represented by the events
Aji =
{
MC validates elector information
(
ji,Rjia
)}
,
Bji =
{
MC rejects elector information
(
ji,Rjia
)
and
resets Rjia to Rjib with new weighting wib
}
,
Crji =
{
MC rejects elector information
(
ji,Rjia
)
and
resets ji to r where 1 = i,nom, 2 = i,valid
}

With these modiﬁcations after MC evaluation, the ﬁnal subjective assessment factor fji ∈
	0, 1
 of candidate i ascribed to elector j becomes
fji =
A∑
a=1
wiaji1Rjia1Aji + wibji1Bji +
2∑
r=1
r1Crji , (3)
where A is the number of weights wia : a = 1, ,A and 1H is the indicator of H .
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Collating the Return Information
Having determined each voter’s fji by this process, the aggregate component f(i) =
1
#(Sall)
∑
j∈Sall fji represents the average subjective view of the voting electorate on candidate
i. The subjective contribution to the overall accomplishment factor Xi of candidate i is
then Xbi = 12 × f(i), whose support is Ub =
[
0, 12
]
 So Xbi carries an implicit weight of
1
2 in Xi Importantly, Xbi places demands on individual electors that go beyond simple
Yes/No or rank voting schemes. Each elector must translate a subjective judgment of a
candidate into a quantitative subjective score for that candidate, indicate the elector’s own
expertise in the research ﬁeld of the candidate, and provide a statement that supports the
subjective assessment. If the elector wants to be conﬁdent the returned score will count in
the election, then the elector must be prepared for an audit. If the return is audited and
fails, then the elector’s peer evaluation will be reweighted in the audit or replaced by a
community based evaluation.10
The elector retains voting privileges to vote on the candidate. This vote and the
subjective assessment end up playing dual roles in the election. Thus, voters inﬂuence
the election of each candidate by transporting their personal information and subjective
assessment of a candidate into a score that affects the merit threshold of the candidate as
well as by a direct Yes/No vote on the candidate. Gaming is discouraged by the threat
of an audit by the MC.
Based on these two components, the overall accomplishment factor is computed as
X = Xa + Xb (omitting the candidate index i) Obvious modiﬁcations involve differential
weights for the objective and subjective elements Xa and Xb in the scheme, with
corresponding differences in the supports Ua and Ub For example, we might set Xa =
 × NM ∈ 	0, 
 and Xb = (1 − ) × f ∈ 	0, 1 − 
 for some preassigned weight  ∈ 	0, 1
 
Then, when  = 0 (respectively, 1) only subjective (objective) assessments are taken into
account.
In order to control the inﬂuence of the additional information embodied in X on
electorate voting, parameters may be set to determine upper (U ) and lower (L) merit
thresholds for election. Thus, U deﬁnes the (upper level) proportion of votes that is
required for election when additional information X takes some minimal value ( ≥ 0).
Similarly, L deﬁnes the (lower level) proportion of votes that is required for election when
additional information X takes some maximal value (u ≤ 1).
With these settings and given the additional information X, the formula for the merit
threshold has the form
 = U1X< + L1X>u +
[
L + (U − L)
{
u − X
u − 
}]
1≤X≤u (4)
10The process is analogous to the peer review process in academic journals, where referee reports and
recommendations are evaluated by an associate editor or co-editor and editor before an editorial decision is
made. Referees often voluntarily return in their cover letters an indication of their own expertise in the ﬁeld,
rather like Rjia
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For each candidate (i) in the election, the corresponding merit threshold i is computed
using formula (4) together with the component information Xi = Xai + Xbi for that
individual. The decision rule in the election of candidate i then depends on the actual
voting percentage (Vi) supporting that candidate in the election. If Vi ≥ i so that the
percentage of actual votes meets or exceeds the candidate’s merit threshold (i), then the
candidate is elected. Symbolically, Ei = 1Vi≥i gives the election outcome (1 = success;
0 = failure).
In practice, the main effect of (4) is to require a higher percentage of votes in
the election for candidates with less demonstrated accomplishment as measured by X
Peer support in the election votes must then be decisive to outweigh the effect of less
demonstrated accomplishment. When the merit threshold bound parameters are equal,
i.e., L = U = , the datum X has no effect on the outcome which is then determined
solely by some speciﬁed threshold level for election (), as commonly occurs in current
societal practice (e.g., in fellowship elections of the Royal Society and the Econometric
Society—see Section A.4 of the Appendix).
Illustration
To clarify the workings of the above formula, we may take a speciﬁc parametric form with
U = 05, L = 02,  = 025, and u = 075 The merit threshold for a candidate (again
omitting the index i) then has the following explicit form:
 =
⎧⎨
⎩
50% if X = Xa + Xb < 14
20% + 30% {1 − 2 (X − 14 )} if 14 ≤ X ≤ 34
20% if X > 34
,
where the following situations hold:
(i) Xa = 12 × N50 , where N = min (2n1 + n2, 50) with n1 = number of sole authored
publications in core designated journals and n2 = number of co-authored publications
in core designated journals;
(ii) Xb = 12 × f and f = 1#(Sall)
∑
j∈Sall fj ∈ 	0, 1
 with fj (more precisely fji for candidate i)
determined as in (3).
In this example, candidates with an accomplishment factor X that is lower than 14 must
receive 50% or more votes in the election to be elected. Likewise, candidates with an
accomplishment factor that exceeds 34 need only receive 20% or more votes in the election
to be elected. In this manner, quantitative evidence on accomplishment and collective
peer evaluation inﬂuence the election outcome by adjustment of the election threshold,
reducing requirements for candidates who have and are perceived to have a strong track
record in the discipline. The parameter settings U = 05, L = 02,  = 025, u = 075
are illustrative. Some computations that show the effect of changes in these parameters,
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and those that determine the density of X and the implied density of  are reported in the
following section.
One likely effect of the introduction of evidence-based merit thresholds is a reduction
of the distortion bias that can arise from cluster voting for less (materially) qualiﬁed
candidates. As mentioned earlier, pre-eminent institutions often have many existing
society fellows and the electoral strength of these voters can be decisive in securing
election for colleagues who may be less materially well qualiﬁed than others at less
eminent institutions. The presence of such candidates at pre-eminent institutions might
itself be regarded as an endogenous indicator of quality and may therefore, in some
formulae, enter into the merit threshold calculation—for example, in the case of the
mechanism described above, it may enter through the peer review factor Xb by way of
the individual quality assessment j However, we can expect that to be elected when an
evidence-based merit threshold is used, such candidates will generally require a greater
percentage of the votes cast in the election if their quantitative merit score X is below the
threshold .
Another mitigating effect in the use of an evidence-based merit threshold is the
reduction of bias arising from invisible college coalition voting for candidates within
certain ﬁelds. In such cases, electors may vote in coalition for some candidates, making it
easier for those candidates to reach a predetermined ﬁxed threshold of votes. Under (4),
however, the peer view of the entire electorate is taken into account in the measurement
of Xb, peer evaluation of the strongest supporters may be audited, and the track record
of material accomplishment of the candidate comes into play in determining Xa These
factors end up determining the merit threshold that is needed for a candidate’s election
and this broad basis of extra information on the candidate will tend to dilute the impact
of coalition voting in the election.
4. THE MERIT THRESHOLD DISTRIBUTION
Some implications of the above formulae can be explored by determining the exact
distribution of X and the implied distribution of . The latter is the main focus and reveals
how various degrees of component information affect the perception of merit and drive
the threshold level.
To proceed, we need to make some further assumptions. It is convenient to assume
that the electorate population is large enough for the key components to be continuously
distributed, leading to a distribution of X over the interval 	0, 1
  The resulting
distribution of  has a mixed continuous and discrete form comprising a double spike and
a smooth distribution. There are point masses at the upper and lower threshold levels U
and L, and a continuous distribution applies between these thresholds. In particular, if
pX (x) is the density of X on its support 	0, 1
 and p(t) is the density of  over (L, U ),
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the upper and lower threshold probabilities are given by
pU = P ( ≥ U ) =
∫ 
0
pX (x)dx, pL = P ( ≤ L) =
∫ 1
u
pX (x)dx, (5)
and the density by
p (t) = pX
(
 + u − 
U − L (U − t)
)
u − 
U − L , for t ∈ (L, U )  (6)
The distribution of X = Xa + Xb is a convolution of its two components. The objective
component
Xa = 12 ×
N
M
= 1
2
× min (Y ,M)
M
∈
[
0,
1
2
]
has a probability mass at 12 arising from the upper bound M on admissable publications
data. As remarked above, this bound delimits quantity effects in bibliometric data to a
preassigned level M . It follows that the density pa (x) of Xa will in general have a spike
at the upper bound 12  The subjective component Xb has density pb (x) = 2pf (2x) where
pf is the density of f ∈ 	0, 1
  If pa,b (xa, xb) is the joint density of (Xa,Xb), then the
distribution of X has the convolution form
pX (x) =
∫ x∧1/2
0
pa,b (x − t, t)dt
With this structure it is possible to obtain the exact density pX (x) in terms of the density11
pY (y) of Y and the density pb (x) of Xb Derivations are given in Section 7.1 of the
Appendix. Under the simplifying assumption of independence12 between Xa and Xb, it is
shown there that
pX (x) = 2M
∫ x∧1/2
0
pY (2M (x − t))pb (t)dt + M × pb
(
x − 1
2
)
× 1x≥ 12 (7)
The density pX (x) can have a jump at x = 12  The size of the jump depends on
the parameter M = P (Xa > M) corresponding to the probability that an individual’s
11In working out the exact distribution theory, it is convenient to let the aggregate publication component
Y = 2n1 + n2 have a continuous density. A corresponding discrete equivalent can be computed by integration
over cells of unit length covering the integers.
12Peer evaluation, as embodied in Xb , is surely inﬂuenced by accomplishment, as measured in Xa So we
can expect Xa and Xb to be dependent in general. In a large elector population, however, there may be
many electors who have little knowledge of the accomplishment of candidates outside their ﬁelds, in which
case the assumption of independence may not be fatally violated. See the discussion in Section 7 on the
Econometric Society fellowship elections, where the Council of the Society noted that “works of several well
known nominees had been read by only a few Fellows” and “ballots show that some nominees failed of
election primarily because their work was to a large extent unknown to the Fellows.”
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FIGURE 1 Densities of X = Xa + Xb for distributions of Xa and Xb corresponding to high accomplishment
(HA) and high peer review (HR), mixed peer review (MR), and low peer review (LR).
publication count exceeds the designated count M The size of the jump also depends on
the value of the density pb (y) of Xb at y = 0 and is zero when pb (0) = 0 so that pX (x) is
continuous in that case. Thus, the population of candidates with a publication count in
excess of the designated maximum produces a point mass in the distribution of Xa giving
a spike and smooth density pa (x) of Xa and, upon convolution, the spike can translate
into a jump in the density of X at x = 12 , the upper point of the domain of Xa, when
pb (0) > 0
Fig. 1 illustrates these possibilities for various accomplishment and peer review
distributions that are fully described later in the Appendix of the article. Discontinuities
in the density pX (x) of X typically arise when there is conﬂict between objective evidence
as it is embodied in the distribution of Xa with a point mass at level M , and peer
review opinion when this produces a positive density to Xb at zero. In Fig. 1, the
two discontinuous densities shown in the broken lines of the ﬁgures arise when high
material accomplishment (manifest in the Xa distribution with P (Xa ≥ M) > 0) couples
with subjective peer review that includes some strong negative opinion (associated with a
density pb (x) of Xb for which pb (0) > 0, reﬂecting a cluster of peer opinion around zero).
The probability mass in Xa leads to a jump in the density at X = 12 and the negative peer
review effect leads to a decline in the subsequent density of X as X approaches its upper
limit of unity. The stronger the negative peer review, the sharper the ultimate decline in
the density, as manifest in the high accomplishment with low peer review (HA and LR)
case in the ﬁgure.
This simple distributional exercise shows how accomplishment and peer review interact
to produce a wide variety of possible informational densities on a candidate that affect
election probability. More extensive illustrations and detailed computations for selected
parameter conﬁgurations are given in the Appendix.
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5. IMPLEMENTATION
Formula (4) seeks to bring both quantitative and qualitative information to bear on
fellowship elections. The intent is to ensure that substantive research accomplishments
and collective peer review count in electing new fellows, so that the threshold of
support from existing fellows is greater (at most U × 100%) for individuals with fewer
accomplishments and is less (at least L × 100%) for those with greater accomplishments.
While the publication count component Xa is primarily quantitative, this measure also has
an implicit qualitative element by virtue of the journal selection and the peer judgments
that underlie publication. Journal selection can obviously be modiﬁed by a society’s
governing council to reﬂect changing standards and evolution of the discipline as it
manifests in core journals. The component Xb allows for the full voting electorate to
return subjective assessments of the candidate. These assessments offer the opportunity
to take account of a wider set of qualiﬁcations (such as acknowledged impact of research
on other disciplines, outstanding pedagogical work, mentorship, and contributions to
software development) so as to more fully reﬂect the professional contributions of an
individual candidate for election. The measure Xb then reﬂects the overall peer assessment
of the candidate across the voting electorate.
Implementation of this procedure requires parameter inputs, data collection and some
computation. The process itself can be coordinated by a society’s secretary and is readily
accomplished online using a web server. Senior ofﬁcers of the society would need to take a
leadership role in deciding on the most suitable version of the system, including the form
of the monitoring committee, appointment of an election ofﬁcer to oversee the election,
and the audit process to overview subjective evaluation of candidates and self ranking by
electors.
The key steps are detailed below.
1. Prior Parameter Settings. Parameters that appear in formula (4) need to be set by the
society, presumably through its governing body or council. The parameters that require
prior setting are as follows:
(a) The domain parameters L, U , , and u that appear directly in formula (4);
(b) The bound parameter M that speciﬁes the upper bound on the number of
publications (or other bibliometric information) considered in the quantity
measure Xa;
(c) The relativity parameter  (currently 2 in (4)) that distinguishes sole authored from
co-authored publications in the publication count Y = 2n1 + n2;
(d) The weight parameter  ∈ 	0, 1
 (currently  = 12 in (4)) which allocates a weight
of  to quantitative information Xa and a weight of 1 −  to subjective assessment
Xb;
(e) The audit trigger parameters
(
L,U
)
and any additional audit triggers (such as
zero variance assessments or self-rankings);
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(f) The maximum length of the supporting statements in elector evaluations of
candidates (such as 200 words).
2. Nominations. Candidates for fellowship need to be nominated by those members
enfranchised to vote in fellowship elections. The information required in a nomination
typically would include the following kinds:
(a) A nominating statement of some designated length (such as 200 words);
(b) A list of n∗ of the candidate’s most inﬂuential publications (such as n∗ ≤ 10);
(c) Citation data on those n∗ publications;
(d) Summary quantitative information on publications including the pair (n1, n2) of
sole authored and co-authored publications;
(e) A subjective assessment factor  ∈ 	0, 1
 of the candidate by the nominator.
3. Deadlines. A deadline is set for the submission of all nominations, including the
objective and subjective information that must accompany the nomination. A date for
the opening of the election is set and a deadline for the return of ballots.
4. Criteria for Nomination. A criterion must be set to determine those nominations that
will be taken to the electorate for voting. For example, all nominated candidates might
be submitted to the electorate or only those candidates who have received at least
a certain number n# of supporting nominations (typically n# ≥ 3). In the case of a
candidate receiving supporting nominations, each nominator may return a different i
5. Ballot Information. Electors receive online ballot information that includes a list of
nominees, the nominating statement for each candidate (i) with a list of the supporting
nominators (j), the objective component Xa, and the subjective component Xnomb =
1
2 × f nom, where f nom = 1#(Snom)
∑
k∈Snom k is the average subjective assessment factor of
the candidate from the nominating electors, which is calculated from the assessments
k submitted by the nominating electors. As discussed in Section 7, dropdown menus
in the online ballot might be available to display further bibliometric and citation
information on the candidates.
6. Elector Returns. The elector returns include as follows:13
(a) The vote itself (Yes/No);
(b) The elector’s subjective assessment factor for each nominated candidate
(voluntary);
(c) The elector’s self rankings of their expertise in the ﬁeld(s) of each candidate
(voluntary);
13As indicated, items b, c, and d are voluntary. Where the information is not provided a default assessment
is created as discussed in Section 3.
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(d) Statements by the elector in support of the elector’s own peer evaluation of each
candidate (voluntary).14
7. Vote Counting. After the election, votes for each candidate are counted. The subjective
assessment data submitted in the election returns by each voter are aggregated to
produce the subjective component Xb and combined with the objective data Xa to
produce X and compute the merit threshold  for each nominated candidate. Actual
votes for candidate i are expressed as a percentage (Vi) of all valid votes cast and
compared with the candidate’s merit threshold i Candidate i is elected if Vi ≥ i
Some computations that are given in the Appendix offer general guidance on the
impact of different parameter settings. More explicit evaluation that is relevant to a
particular society can be conducted through simulations that mirror ingredients within
the formula (such as particular parameter settings) that produce outcomes like those of
earlier societal elections (conducted without the formula) and alternative outcomes that
result from other parameter settings (as counterfactual tests to evaluate the sensitivity
of outcomes to parameter changes). These simulations and guidelines can be assessed by
the governing body to determine the adequacy of certain parameter ranges for society
purposes.
Importantly, even without formulae such as (4), elections require some parameter
settings, which are then implicit in the simpler system. For instance, in an election system
where only votes count, the merit threshold  for election must still be determined. Such
a system has  = L = U , and information in X is then completely ignored.
Any quantitative information like (n1, n2) that is submitted in the nomination can
be cross-checked through an online service that provides automated harvesting of
publication data. To ensure uniform treatment across candidates, a society may require
that all publication data be obtained (and checked) in this way from a reputable
bibliometric harvester, much as some universities now do in conducting research
assessment exercises on faculty and departments.
6. BROADER ISSUES
Beyond fellowship elections, learned societies and academia lie much wider qualitative
assessment issues facing humanity. Rankings of “excellence” and “quality” are widespread
in modern society touching every aspect of life—the environment, health care, crime,
politics, education, ﬁnance, and the economy. Economists are far from being the only
14A single sentence may be sufﬁcient, such as “I know the candidate’s work well, can conﬁrm that
the papers listed in the nominating statement are signiﬁcant contributions, and am strongly supportive of
election,” or “I have read several of the candidate’s papers, ﬁnd the research to be incremental and believe
it is too early to support election of this candidate.”
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professionals concerned about the rapid advance in the use of data from bibliometric
and other online sources in such quality assessments. The President of the Institute of
Mathematical Statistics recently exhorted the broad community of statisticians on these
matters, saying that
... almost alone we have the skills to respond to them, for example by developing
new methodologies or by pointing out that existing approaches are challenged.
To illustrate the fact that issues that are obvious to statisticians are often ignored
in bibliometric analysis, I mention that many proponents of impact factors, and
other aspects of citation analysis, have little concept of the problems caused by
averaging heavy tailed data. We should deﬁnitely take a greater interest in this
area. (Hall, 2011).
Some of the underlying problems in this area relate to the issue of index selection
for latent concepts like “academic excellence” (as we have been discussing here), “quality
of life” or “well being,” all of which rely on multivariate data, multi-indicators, and
subjective assessment. Index number construction has a long history in economics
going back in modern form for over one and a half centuries, whereas interest
in multidimensioned indices for concepts such as deprivation or wellbeing is more
recent (e.g., Atkinson and Bourguignon, 1982; Atkinson, 2003; Maasoumi, 1999). Early
investigators were challenged by the paucity of data. But in modern society, terabytes of
information descend weekly on libraries, statistical agencies, social networks, international
agencies, and central banks.15 Sorting, storing, and sensibly describing these vast
quantities of data are major undertakings even for the academic rankings that have
proliferated in recent years (e.g., Baltagi, 2007). But analyzing and creating useful indices
from very high dimensional electronic data sets is a far greater challenge that requires
novel methods and algorithms from the rapidly expanding ﬁeld of high dimensional
statistical analysis while also accounting for possible effects from averaging heavy tailed
data (Hall and Miller, 2010), as indicated in the above citation.
At the same time as electronic information has mushroomed in society, there has been
growing disquiet over inadequate uses or analyses of such information and the possible
consequences of misleading information. A high proﬁle example that was catapaulted into
public awareness by the global ﬁnancial crisis (GFC) is the ranking of ﬁnancial instruments
by credit rating agencies. During the GFC massive losses were incurred in the market
for highly structured ﬁnancial instruments such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)
despite the AAA and Aaa ratings assigned to the instruments by these agencies. The
elevated point ratings of CDOs did not reﬂect the concentration in risk and associated
15Wikipedia reports that the U.S. Library of Congress adds 5 terabytes (TB) of information per month,
that internet trafﬁc is estimated to be around 160TB a second, that Germany’s climate research centre
generates 10,000 TB of data per year, that Wikipedia itself had a 5.87TB dump of raw data in January 2010,
and that Google processes about 24 petabytes of user-generated data per day.
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vulnerabilities arising from the bundling of very large numbers of similar securities. Ensuing
criticisms of rating agency practices have pointed to the bias in their risk assessments of
highly structured ﬁnancial products, but these criticisms have led to little change in analysis
and reporting. To address these criticisms, greater transparency about the dimensional
composition of ﬁnancial products is required, as well as more thorough investigation and
data analysis, coupled with improved reporting mechanisms that more accurately reﬂect
essential product features and associated risks. Such improved reporting requires much
more than a one-dimensional ranking involving a simple letter grade.
In addition to the task of trawling through vast data sets to produce quantitative
information that is relevant to a quality assessment exercise, we must also accommodate
subjective human assessments in quality indices of human existence. Just as peer review
is considered an essential element in academic merit assessment, human judgment is an
important factor in most other areas of quality assessment. For example, in ranking
city quality of living, published indices normally rely on neutral objective information
about a host of measurable elements such as air quality, crime rates, infrastructure,
and amenities. But city residents have their own personal assessments of cultural and
recreational facilities, a city’s ethnic diversity, its climate and environment, and its
amenities. Combining these dual sources of objective and subjective data, accounting for
the differential background information that is inevitably involved in human assessment,
and understanding the statistical implications of the averaging process involved in index
construction from high-dimensional sources of data is the much broader arena within
which the task of meritocracy assessment resides.
7. ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY FELLOWSHIP ELECTIONS
While many of the issues we have raised have broader import in the general area of
quality assessment, they are particularly relevant to the Econometric Society (ES) which
has been an honor society with a meritocracy of fellows from its inception. Since 1960, the
ES has operated an approval voting system for new fellows whereby new candidates for
fellowship are elected if the fraction of voters who approve the candidate is greater than a
certain threshold (now 30%). Setting the proposals of the present article in the context of
the ES highlights some of the advantages of an extended system of election with greater
information content but also reveals some practical difﬁculties of implementation. We
consider these brieﬂy here and encourage a wider discussion to promote improvements in
the current system of election. Some aspects of the evolution of ES election procedures
are also of interest and will be discussed in what follows.
1. Since the ES now publishes three journals, a simple starting point in the construction
of an objective quality measure such as Xa would be to use these journals as the
core designated journals and count each candidate’s publications in these journals,
discounting multiple authored papers by some scale factor, as in the measure Y . While
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some members of the ES may see this system as reasonable, others may view the
exclusion of leading ﬁeld journals or other general interest journals as unfair to those
ﬁelds that are not well represented (or increasingly under-represented) in the society
journals (c.f. the remarks in footnote 2). After all, it took the society 80 years to
expand its own journal offerings,16 whilst the subject reach of quantitative economics,
economic theory, and econometrics grew massively producing a vast offering of leading
ﬁeld journals and related general interest journals in which the ES played no role.
There is no immediate way to reconcile these different perspectives, just as it took
the ES a long time to respond to calls for the expansion of its journal offerings. But
active consultation with members does help. For instance, society members (or fellows)
could be asked to determine (or vote on) the issue themselves by a process of core
journal augmentation. Each year members could nominate new journals for inclusion
in the core and in an annual election journals could be added (or eliminated) by an
approval voting system with some designated threshold of votes for inclusion. Such
a system would accommodate subject-based evolution that is reﬂected in the growing
importance of certain journal outlets outside of the ES offerings. As in the current
paper’s analysis, such a voting system could be modiﬁed to take into account more
information than simple Yes/No voting.
2. Evidence mentioned in the introduction in footnote 3 indicates that for some time the
ES has not been electing many potential fellows who rank highly in terms of various
quality measures, including multiple publication counts in the society’s ﬂagship journal
Econometrica, while others are elected who have no publications in Econometrica. Part
of this information about candidate quality is already present in nominating statements
that are available to electors prior to voting. So, a natural question is why voters are
apparently not taking account of this information, given actual election outcomes. One
possible explanation is that electors in the relevant subﬁeld of these candidates are
acting on the information but lack the voting power to meet the required threshold.
The widely recognized difﬁculty in electing candidates in econometrics, particularly
econometric theory, supports this explanation. Exceptions where election is easier in
such subﬁelds typically occur for candidates in top tier institutions in North America,
where voting power is heavily concentrated giving those candidates a comparative
advantage because of additional collegial cross-ﬁeld voting in support of their election.
Another possible explanation is that many voters do not use the information in the
nominating statements and only vote for the candidates that they know well. Or they
may simply ﬁnd it too time consuming to research all the candidates and make quality
comparisons. In such cases, electors may need to be provided with key summary
16Proposals to expand the list of ES journals go back a long way. For example, to reﬂect the substantial
expansion and growth in diversity in the discipline by the 1980s, the author proposed to the society in 1982
that Econometrica be expanded into two ﬂagship journals, one subtitled in Economic Theory, and the other
in Econometrics, much as the Institute of Mathematical Statistics created the Annals of Probability and
Annals of Statistics out of the original Annals of Mathematical Statistics.
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information that includes quality indicators on each candidate directly online in the
ballot form. This information can be delivered in the ballot form itself or via a pull
down menu which provides ready access to the data and more sophisticated options,
like selecting for perusal only those candidates with at least some (user-speciﬁed)
number of publications in certain journals. Voters might also be required to check
some such information on every candidate before their voting option is enabled,
thereby enforcing exposure to some relevant data on the candidates.17 These options
conform with the suggestions of the present paper to increase the information content
available to electors on the ballot, to enforce some exposure to the data, and to
incentivize a greater level of participation by electors in the election process.
3. Field under-representation could also be partly addressed by implementing a version of
a quota system, like that operated by the Royal Society and the National Academy of
Sciences, or a section system like that operated by the British Academy—see Appendix
A.4 for further information about the election processes in these societies. Quota upper
limits placed on the number of candidates elected in a particular ﬁeld or section help to
ensure representation in each of those sections, much like a proportional representation
system in political elections.
4. Allowing for an abstention option in approval voting would provide a simple way for
electors to register insufﬁcient knowledge of a candidate to cast a vote. Abstentions
would be excluded from the electoral count proportion and, as a referee suggested, may
therefore help to reduce bias against candidates whose work is less known. This facility
might be supplemented with a requirement that a minimum number (or proportion)
of electors cast votes to eliminate extreme outcomes such as a 50% vote in favor of a
candidate based on only two people voting.
5. A further mechanism to enhance elector participation, suggested by a referee, is
for voters to record their own suggested threshold percentage in their ballots. The
median response might then be used to set the threshold voting percentage. This
has the advantage of simplicity and it endogenizes the threshold according to voter
preferences, instead of by council mandate. On the other hand, such a threshold is
global and not individual speciﬁc. A variant of this method might take account of the
distribution to set upper and lower bounds on the threshold that might be used in
conjunction with quantitative and qualitative assessment data.
These are just a few of the many possibilities that might be considered in making the
ES ballot system and its fellowship more representative of the discipline’s immense and
growing diversity. All of these possibilities involve increased use of data and/or elector
participation in the election process.
In comparison with the procedures outlined in this article, the present ES nomination
and voting arrangements are simplistic and the ES fellows ballot requires no input from
17At present, there is no requirement in the online system for electors to look at the nominating statement
before voting.
28 P. C. B. PHILLIPS
electors other than an approval vote. The original procedures of the ES in selecting new
fellows were substantially more complex than the present arrangements. They involved
discussion and debate about potential candidates within the Council (the body charged
with making nominations) prior to actual nomination and required far greater input from
electors. Readers are referred to Bjerkholt (1998) for a history of the evolving processes of
ES fellows elections during the 1930s, the role of Ragnar Frisch in these developments,18
and some of the controversies that arose during this period. Importantly, some guidelines
for qualiﬁcations were laid down by the Council, requiring candidates to be an economist,
statistician, have some knowledge of higher mathematics, and have made some original
contributions to knowledge, including economic theory.19,20 Demands were also placed
on electors that required them to acknowledge whether or not they had read any works
by the candidate and whether they had “critically scrutinized representative works of
nominees” (Bjerkholt, 1998, p. 54). The electors (who by 1935 were the ES Fellows)
were asked to categorize candidates according to the electors’ subjective assessments of
candidate distinction and record electoral votes into four classiﬁed columns (detailed in
Bjerkholt, 1998, p. 54) as follows:
“(a) Votes for nominees considered to have at least as high qualiﬁcations for fellowship
as the average of the present Fellows”;
“(b) Votes for the better half for those already marked in colum (a)”;
“(c) Votes for those nominees in column (b) who it is very strongly felt should be
elected”;
“(d) Votes against those nominees whose election is very strongly opposed.”
18For further reading on Frisch, see Bjerkholt (1995, 2005, 2015).
19Correspondence between Irving Fisher (President of the ES) and Ragnar Frisch (Editor of Econometrica)
provided guideline criteria for the selection of Fellows. In a letter to Council on 12/01/1932, Fisher
appended a statement listing 5 qualiﬁcation categories for selecting fellows: “1. They should be economists;
2. They should be mathematical; 3. They should be statisticians; 4. They should have made some original
contributions; 5. Some of these contributions should be in economic theory.” In a response to Fisher on
1/11/1933, Frisch indicated agreement on these criteria, which he re-articulated as: “1. The candidate must
be an economist acquainted with economic theory; 2. He must have a mathematical foundation; 3. He must
have some knowledge of statistics; 4. He must have done some original work; 5. Some of this original
work must have been in economic theory.” This correspondence is contained in the Frisch correspondence
collection of the National Library of Norway. I am obliged to Olav Bjerkholt for sending me copies of this
correspondence.
20These qualiﬁcations for fellowship of the ES are very close to the requirements for membership of the
society that were originally laid out in a letter of June 17, 1930 to multiple recipients from Irving Fisher,
Charles Roos, and Ragnar Frisch (from the Ragnar Frisch Archive, the National Library of Norway). These
requirements limited membership to those who: “(a) are thoroughly familiar with general economic theory;
(b) have a working knowledge of mathematics as applied to economic theory and statistics; (c) have some
knowledge of accounting; and (d) have published an original contribution to economic theory or to the
analysis of such economic statistics or accounting as have a deﬁnite bearing on problems in economic theory.”
The reader is referred to Bjerkholt and Qin (2010) for further discussion of this history, ES membership
elegibility, and related matters.
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Votes in categories (a), (b), and (c) were assigned respective weights 1,3, and 5, and
aggregated to give totals for all candidates. In the 1935 election, four candidates with the
highest score were elected. In announcing the election outcome, the Council noted
A surprising result of the vote was the discovery that works of several well known
nominees had been read by only a few Fellows. Indeed, the ballots show that
some nominees failed of election primarily because their work was to a large
extent unknown to the Fellows. (Econometrica, Vol. 3, pp. 477–478; qtd. in
Bjerkholt, 1998)
These early fellowship elections in the ES therefore revealed information not only
about the candidates but also about existing fellows. In placing greater demands on
the electorate, in encouraging the reading of representative works of candidates, and in
weighting subjective assessments, these procedures of the original ES fellows elections
have elements in common with the ideas outlined in the present work. Online electronic
dispersal of nominating materials and ballots and the ready availability of bibliometric
data help to facilitate more complex data-intensive procedures and open up an array
of new possibilities in terms of information dissemination, assessment mechanisms,
and voting protocols that were unavailable in the early years. In the light of these
vast changes in our computing and communication facilities, it may seem ironic that
the ES nomination, ballot, and voting protocols have become so simplistic, placing
virtually no demands on the electorate other than an approval vote. In spite of the
simplicity of the electronic voting procedure, nonvoting appears to be a persistent
problem in ES fellowship elections.21 Various measures can be implemented to help
improve participation rates, such as greater transparency in the elections (e.g., reporting
the proportion of nonparticipants by country or region), leadership from the council
and society president urging participation, or use of the regional standing committees to
contact fellows in the region and encourage nominations and voting.
8. CONCLUSION
The focus of the present contribution is the appraisal of credentials, the operational
use of available quantitative information and the pooling of human judgment across a
population of voters in the process of electing new members to a meritocracy. Some of
the problems addressed here might also be studied in a dynamic voting environment. A
learned society is a social institution in which the size of its fellowship (itself an electorate)
is endogenous since it is determined by voting decisions taken by this same electorate
over time. Such dynamic voting problems have been studied in the economic theory and
behavioral literature, where new complexities have been discovered. In exploring club
21As one referee put it, “my impression is that a signiﬁcant number of fellows do not vote in an election.”
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voting decisions, for instance, Roberts (1999) has shown that dynamic voting on club
size leads to time inconsistent outcomes and intrinsic steady states in the system that are
determined by the voting dynamics. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) have developed a
dynamic model of the voting franchise that seeks to explain gradual processes of reform
and democratization such as the emergence of western democracy. More general problems
of endogenous social choice and policy determination have been studied recently in
Luganoff (2009). This research in economic theory is relevant in the current setting
of meritocracy voting because it focuses on the evolution of the voting franchise over
time and the effects of this endogeneity on institutional structure and reform. On the
other hand, none of this work addresses the issue of appraisal that is fundamental to
meritocracy.
The goal of ‘measuring merit’ is undoubtedly elusive. But as the header to this article
entreats, the difﬁculty of the challenge should not prevent the attempt. Within economics
and more broadly among the social sciences, theory and measurement are seen as twin
sisters that work in unison to advance our understanding of human behavior and society.
It surely beﬁts such disciplines and particularly economics, so often regarded as the
queen of the social sciences, to pioneer a way of bringing the “theory quantitative” and
“empirical quantitative” into societal decision making on matters as fundamental to a
meritocracy as fellowship elections.
The formulae given here are a ﬁrst step in addressing these issues. The speciﬁc rule
(4) is designed to assist in the merit selection process by explicitly taking into account
subjective assessments of individual candidates for election as well as direct quantitative
measures of quality such as publication numbers in learned journals, rankings or citations.
As we have argued, quantitative assessment rules may help decision makers widen the
effective electorate of opinion, thereby enhancing the information set that is available
for consideration in evaluating candidates. Information on publications ends up reﬂecting
assessments and recommendations that are sought in the peer review process. Citations
may be interpretated to provide some information about received opinion on research
(or its relevance or neglect), while acknowledging the many caveats regarding these
interpretations—as discussed, for example, in Cozzens, 1989, and Brooks, 1986.22 The
import in both cases is that a wider body of views and material evidence comes into
consideration when the information is embodied in a merit threshold for election.
In this process, the demands on voters and decision makers are greater than in
simple Yes/No or rank order voting. But if voters want to avoid these demands and
simply record an approval vote, then they may choose to do so. Our view is that the
22The interpretation of citation data has spawned a large literature that reveals the sociological complexity
of the practice. For example, in her study of the factors involved in citation, Cozzens (1989) notes that the
recognition/reward element of citations neglects rhetorical factors such as convenience (“the easier it is to
ﬁt the knowledge claims of the article into the rhetoric of later papers, the more likely the article is to be
cited”); and Brooks (1986) reports empirical evidence from author surveys covering a wide range of academic
departments that 70% of the citations surveyed arose from a “complex interplay of multiple citer motives”
involving positive credit, negative credit, and service to the reader elements, some of which may be conﬂicting.
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demands are to be encouraged, especially in a democratic voting system involving highly
qualiﬁed electors whose information and skill sets are broad and heterogeneous. As we
have explained, the demands enable voters to inﬂuence the election of candidates in
several ways. They report their subjective assessment of a candidate into a numerical
score that combines, possibly in a weighted form that takes into account their self
selected ﬁeld expertise, with the judgments of other voters to produce an overall peer
review assessment. This component then combines with material information about
the candidate to determine the candidate’s merit threshold. Electors also record an
individual vote on the candidate which combines with other votes to determine the actual
voting percentage in favor of the candidate’s election. The subjective assessment, the self
expressed ﬁeld expertise, and the individual vote all inﬂuence the ﬁnal outcome. And an
audit process helps to ensure elector integrity in election responses.
The formulation given here is a beginning. Obviously a great deal more work can go
into its further mathematical development, into the use of voting theory in its design, and
into its online implementation. More attention to data sources, bibliometric measures,
and the quantiﬁcation of subjective assessment all seem desirable. Empirical work may
also be possible using past fellowship election data to determine parameters implicit
in existing rules and to perform counterfactuals. The present article will have achieved
its immediate goal if it stimulates further thinking on these issues and on the general
problem of quantifying the assessment of merit. The longer term and more ambitious
goal of this research is to assist learned societies in the complex task of sensibly utilizing
wider information sets in critical decision making on meritocracy elections, so that these
elections more accurately mirror research accomplishment in the discipline. Research on
this topic is important not only for learned societies but for the many other instances in
academic life where merit assessment is a critical matter in the careers and lives of our
colleagues.
A. APPENDIX
A.1. The Merit Threshold Distribution
To ﬁnd the distribution of , we need the distribution of X, which in turn depends on the
distribution of its components Xa and Xb The support of Xa = 12 NM is
[
0, 12
]
, the support
of Xb = 12f is
[
0, 12
]
, and the support of X is 	0, 1
. For simplicity, we assume that Xa and
Xb are independent with respective densities pa (x) and pb (x) = 2pf (2x) where pf is the
density of f ∈ 	0, 1
  The density of X is then given by the convolution
p (x) =
∫ x∧1/2
0
pa (x − t)pb (t)dt (8)
The density pa (x) of Xa is complicated by a point mass at x = 12 arising from the
upper bound of N = min (Y ,M) where Y = 2n1 + n2 It is convenient to let (n1, n2) have
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a continuous joint density p12 (a, b) over [0,∞) × [0,∞) This distribution can readily be
transformed into a discrete distribution by rounding up or down noninteger values of
(n1, n2) and obtaining the corresponding discrete probability distribution over × by
integration over rectangles covering the integers. It is easier to work with the continuous
version, and under these assumptions, the density of Y is
pY (y) = 12
∫ ∞
0
p12 (05 (y − b) , b)db
Since N = min (Y ,M) = Y1Y<M + M1Y≥M, the distribution of N is mixed continuous-
discrete with a rectiﬁed (spike and smooth) density
pN (y) = pY (y) × 10≤Y<M + M ×  (y − M) , (9)
where M = P Y ≥ M =
∫∞
M pY (y)dy and  (x) is the Dirac delta function. The cdf of
N is
PN (y) =
∫ y∧M
0
pY (s)ds + M × U (y − M) ,
where U (x) is the step function U (x) = 1x≥0 The implied (rectiﬁed) density of Xa = 12 NM
is pa (x) = 2MpN (2Mx), which has the explicit form
pa (x) = 2MpY (2Mx) × 10≤x< 12 + M × 
(
2M
(
x − 1
2
))
, (10)
with a point mass of M at x = 1/2.
Combining (8) and (10), the density pX (x) over x ∈ 	0, 1
 is given by
∫ x∧1/2
0
pa (x − t)pb (t)dt
= 2M
∫ x∧1/2
0
pY (2M (x − t)) 10≤x−t< 12pb (t)dt
+ M ×
∫ x
0

(
2M
(
x − t − 1
2
))
pb (t)dt
= 2M
∫ x∧1/2
0
pY (2M (x − t))pb (t)dt + Mpb
(
x − 1
2
)
× 1x≥ 12, (11)
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yielding (7). Observe that pY (2M (x − t)) = 0 for x − t < 0 and pb (t) = 0 for t > 1/2, so
that
∫ 1
0
pX (x)dx = 2M
∫ 1
0
∫ x∧1/2
0
pY (2M (x − t))pb (t)dtdx + M
∫ 1
05
pb
(
x − 1
2
)
dx
= 2M
∫ 1/2
0
∫ x
0
pY (2M (x − t))pb (t)dtdx
+2M
∫ 1
1/2
∫ 1/2
0
pY (2M (x − t))pb (t)dtdx + M
∫ 05
0
pb (s)ds
=
∫ 1/2
0
∫ 2M( 12−t)
0
pY (s)dspb (t)dt +
∫ 1/2
0
∫ M
2M( 12−t)
pY (s)dspb (t)dt + M
=
∫ 1/2
0
∫ M
0
pY (s)pb (t)dtdx + M =
∫ M
0
pY (s)dx + M = 1 − M + M = 1
A.2. Exact Theory
An exact theory suitable for computation can be obtained under explicit distributional
assumptions concerning the primitive components (n1, n2, f) that determine the objective
and subjective elements in X We work with continuous distributions and simple
parameterizations so that it is convenient to explore how different distributional shapes
in the primitives impact the merit threshold distribution.
Let n1 ∼  (1, 1) , n2 ∼  (2, 2) , and f = 1#(Sall)
∑
j∈Sall fj ∼ B (, ). Here  (, )
denotes the gamma distribution with scale parameter  > 0, shape parameter  > 0, and
density p (x) = 1
()
x−1e−x/ for x ≥ 0, with mean  (n) =  and standard deviation
 (n) = 1/2; and B (, ) denotes the beta distribution with parameters ,  ≥ 0 and
density p (x) = 1B(,)x−1 (1 − x)−1 for x ∈ 	0, 1
 , with mean  (f) = / ( + ) and
standard deviation  (f) = ()1/2 / {( + )2 ( +  + 1)}1/2.
The distribution of Y = 2n1 + n2 is the sum  (1, 21) +  (2, 2)  Upon convolution
of these two gamma distributions and after some calculation, we obtain the density of Y
pY (x) = x
−1e−x/21
 () (21)
1 22
∞∑
j=0
(2)j
j! ()j
(
1
21
− 1
2
)j
xj
= e
−x/21x−1
 () (21)
1 22 1
F1
(
2, ; x
{
1
21
− 1
2
})
, (12)
where 1F1 is a conﬂuent hypergeometric function, with  = 1 + 2, and where we take
2 > 21 (a similar formula holds when 2 < 21). When 2 = 21 =  the density is simply
a gamma distribution with composite parameters (, ).
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The distribution of X = Xa + Xb = 12 NM + 12f , where N = min (Y ,M) , can now be
obtained by quadrature using (7) upon speciﬁcation of the parameters. The parameters
can be classiﬁed as follows: (i) density parameters 1, 1, 2, 2, ,  that govern
accomplishment and peer assessment; and (ii) control parameters M , , u that implement
policy concerning winsorizing bibliometric data via the upper bound M and the upper
u and lower  limits to the overall assessment factor X which determine the merit
thresholds.
A.3. Numerical Illustrations
The distribution (12) can be used for computation given explicit parameter values for
the determining densities and the control parameters. We illustrate with the following
classiﬁcations shown in Table 1 of the parameters corresponding to a selection of
accomplishment and peer review levels ( and  denote mean and standard deviation of
the respective distributions).
The high and low peer review parameters give mirror image densities for the peer
review variate Xb on [0, 05] and the mixed peer review parameters correspond to a
uniform density, as shown in Fig. 2. The distribution of the bibliometric variate Y =
2n1 + n2 is calculated using (12), and the densities are shown in Fig. 3 for high, mixed,
and low levels of accomplishment. The overall variate X = Xa + Xb has density pX(x)
which is computed using (11). The densities are shown in Fig. 1 (given earlier in the
paper) for high accomplishment (HA) combined with high peer review (HR), mixed peer
review (MR), and low peer review (LR). Figs. 4–5 show the corresponding densities for a
mixed level of accomplishment (MA) and low accomplishment (LA). The merit threshold
distribution of  is computed using the rectiﬁed (double spike and smooth) density p(t)
given in (5) and (6). Table 2 presents summary statistics calculated for this merit threshold
distribution, showing the probability P( ≥ U ) of exceeding the upper threshold U ,
the probability P( ≤ L) of exceeding the lower threshold L, and the mean threshold
level ().
TABLE 1
Parameter Classiﬁcations
Peer Review High Mixed Low
(, )  = 5,  = 1  = 1,  = 1  = 1,  = 5
(f) (f) 0.83 0.14 0.5 0.28 0.16 0.14
Accomplishment High Mixed Low
(1, 2, 1, 2) (2, 8, 2, 4) (2, 2, 2, 3) (1, 2, 05, 2)
 (n1)  (n2) 8 32 4 6 0.5 4
 (n1)  (n2) 2.83 11.31 2.82 4.24 0.5 2.82
Controls (M , 1, 2) =
(
50, 14 ,
3
4
)
MERITOCRACY VOTING: MEASURING THE UNMEASURABLE 35
FIGURE 2 Peer review (Xb) density pb(x) = 2(2x)−1(1−2x)−1B(,) for low peer review  = 1,  = 5 (solid/green),
mixed peer review  = 1,  = 1 (dotted/black), and high peer review  = 5,  = 1 (dashed/blue)
FIGURE 3 Densities of the bibliometric component Y = 2n1 + n2 for parameter values corresponding to high
(HA), mixed (MA), and low (LA) levels of accomplishment given in Table 1
High accomplishment and high peer review produce a density for overall
accomplishment X that is concentrated in the upper part of the interval [0, 1], which
leads to a high probability P( ≤ L) = 0762 of reaching the lower threshold L and
makes fellowship election easier. The mean threshold level in this case is  () = 0236,
close to the lower bound control parameter L = 02 Fig. 1 shows discontinuities
in the density pX(x) in two cases (HA and MR; HA and LR) which arise from a
nonnegligible probability P(Xa ≥ M) of Xa exceeding the control parameter bound M
which delimits quantity effects in bibliometric data to that level. In each of these cases
the density pb
(
x − 12
)
> 0 at x = 12 , thereby producing the discontinuity in pX(x). In the
high peer review case (HA and HR), pb
(
x − 12
) = 0 at x = 12 and the density pX (x) is
continuous.
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FIGURE 4 Densities of X = Xa + Xb for mixed accomplishment (MA) and high (HR), mixed (MR), and low
(LR) peer review
FIGURE 5 Densities of X = Xa + Xb for low accomplishment (LA) and high (HR), mixed (MR), and low
(LR) peer review.
In a similar way, low accomplishment and low peer review produce a density for X
that is concentrated in the lower part of the interval 	0, 1
, giving a high probability
P ( ≥ U ) = 0912 of exceeding the upper threshold U and a zero probability of reaching
the lower threshold L, making fellowship election harder because of the high voting
threshold required for election. In this case, the mean threshold level is  () = 0496,
which is very close to the upper bound control parameter U = 05 Table 2 provides a
selection of other cases, showing how mixtures of high and low levels of accomplishment
and peer reviews affect the merit threshold.
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TABLE 2
Merit Threshold Statistics
Peer Review High Mixed Low
Accomplishment High Mixed Low High Mixed Low High Mixed Low
P ( ≥ U ) 0.000 0.003 0.013 0.008 0.227 0.337 0.031 0.651 0.912
P ( ≤ L) 0.762 0.028 0.000 0.371 0.008 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.000
 () 0.236 0.316 0.369 0.323 0.406 0.445 0.421 0.482 0.496
A.4. Fellowship Elections in Economics, Statistics and National Academies
This Appendix provides some background information on fellowship election or
appointment procedures as they are currently performed in various leading societies in
economics, statistics and the natural sciences.
Econometric Society: Annual fellowship elections are held and the electorate comprises
existing fellows of the society. (Prior to 1960 fellows were nominated and elected by the
council.) Names of candidates nominated for election are placed on a ballot and fellows
return a Yes/No vote. To secure election, candidates must obtain 30% or more votes in
the election. Nominations are by petition of at least three members of the society (who
are usually, but not necessarily, fellows) or by a nominating committee appointed by
the president. Nominations include a statement of the candidate’s contributions, a list
of up to six major publications, reference to the candidate’s home webpage, and a list
of those nominating the candidate and an indication whether the nominating committee
endorses the candidate. “To be eligible for nomination as a Fellow, a person must have
published original contributions to economic theory or to such statistical, mathematical,
or accounting analyses as have a deﬁnite bearing on problems in economic theory, and
must be, or upon election become, a member of the Society.”23
American Economic Association: Distinguished fellowships are by special
appointment. “Past Presidents of the Association shall be Distinguished Fellows.
Additional Distinguished Fellows may be elected, but not more than three in any one
calendar year from economists of high distinction in the United States and Canada.”24
European Economic Association: Fellows are elected by virtue of the ofﬁce held in
the Association. Fellowships are “bestowed on the Association’s ofﬁcers, the editors of
the Association’s journal, the Programme Chairs of its annual Congresses, as well as
the Marshall and Schumpeter lecturers. Becoming a Fellow is contingent on becoming a
member of the association.”25
23Econometric Society website is http://www.econometricsociety.org/society.asp.
24American Economic Association website is http://www.vanderbilt.edu/AEA/disting_fellows.htm.
25European Economic Association website is http://www.eeassoc.org/index.php?page=21.
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Institute of Mathematical Statistics: Election is by a special fellows selection committee
which reviews nominations. Qualiﬁcation for fellowship requires “demonstrated
distinction in research in statistics or probability by publication of independent work
of merit” or “well-established leadership whose contributions to the ﬁeld of statistics or
probability    or the application of statistics or probability    shall be judged of equal
value.”26
Royal Statistical Society: No merit assessment is required. “Fellowship is open to all
who have an interest in statistics: formal qualiﬁcations are not needed.”27
American Statistical Association: Election is by a fellows selection committee which
reviews nominations that require online submission of detailed forms about the candidate,
letters of support (at most four), draft citations, and other information. “Each committee
member assigns a rating from 1 to 5 to a given nominee, with 1 being the lowest and
5 being the highest; non-integer ratings are perfectly acceptable. Though there are no
ﬁxed criteria for rating a nomination, the following table provides some examples of
how a rater might typically react to a nomination package.”28 This table29 indicates the
potential impact of various criteria on a committee member’s subjective assessment of
a nominated candidate. For example, “sole authorship of 5 or more articles in leading
statistical journals”, “strong evidence of positive impact of mentoring,” and “Program
committee chair for a major ASA meeting”30 are all rated as “++” in terms of impact.
The Royal Society: There is an upper limit of 44 new Fellows, 8 Foreign Members
and 1 Honorary Fellow. Candidates for the Fellowship or Foreign Membership must
be nominated by two Fellows of the Royal Society, who sign a certiﬁcate of proposal.
“The Council of the Royal Society oversees the selection process. Two Ofﬁcers, the
Biological Sciences Secretary and the Physical Sciences Secretary, are responsible for the
smooth running of this process. The Council appoints ten subject area committees, known
as Sectional Committees, to advise it about the selection of the list of the strongest
candidates. Each candidate is considered by the relevant Sectional Committee on the basis
of a full curriculum vitae, details of their research achievements, a list of all their scientiﬁc
publications and a copy of their 20 best scientiﬁc papers. Members of the Sectional
Committees vote to produce a short-list. The ﬁnal list of candidates is conﬁrmed by the
Council and a secret ballot of Fellows is held. A candidate is elected if he or she secures
two-thirds of votes.”31
The British Academy: Fellowship is by election and Academy Council decision.
“Candidates are proposed by Section Standing Committees, Fellows or by Vice
Chancellors and Principals of U.K. Universities. Section Committees meet to agree the
26IMS ofﬁcial website is http://www.imstat.org/awards/fellows.htm.
27Royal Statistical Society website is http://membership.rss.org.uk/main.asp?page=1280.
28American Statistical Association website is http://www.amstat.org/.
29See http://www.amstat.org/fellows/nominations/pdfs/RatingofNominees.pdf.
30American Statistical Association website is http://www.amstat.org/careers/fellows.cfm.
31The Royal Society website is http://royalsociety.org/about-us/fellowship/election/.
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names to be put to a secret ballot within each Section. Sections agree the names of
assessors. The case for election and the particular distinction of each candidate is sent
to assessors. The reports of assessors supply an independent judgment to supplement
and inform the deliberations of the Section. A secret ballot is then conducted within
each Section. Sections meet to study the ballot results and to make recommendations
to the humanities and social science Groups, which are responsible for ensuring
consistency across Sections. The Groups’ and the Fellowship and Structures Committee’s
recommendations are considered and discussed by the Academy’s Council, which agrees
a list of names to be nominated for election to the Annual General Meeting of Fellows.”32
The National Academy of Sciences: Membership is by election. “Only Academy
members may submit formal nominations. Consideration of a candidate begins with his
or her nomination, followed by an extensive and careful vetting process that results in a
ﬁnal ballot at the Academy’s annual meeting. Currently, a maximum of 84 members may
be elected annually.”33
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